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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By WILLIAM P. CANTWELL
Partner in the Denver firm of Holland and Hart
Instructor, University of Denver College of Law

A landmark trust decision' highlighted the case law developments in
the field of wills, estates and trusts in 1958. At the same time, several
other cases of interest etched in new guidelines and provided further
clarification for practitioners.
Denver National Bank v. Von Brecht' attracted wide interest" and
has answered questions of the first importance in Colorado. Gustavus
Adolphus Von Brecht entered into a trust agreement on July 15, 1946,
under which he retained substantial powers, including powers to revoke, modify, amend, and to veto proposed investments in excess of
one thousand dollars. He also retained the income, and created a remainder in favor of siblings and their descendants. The attack on the
trust was four pronged, but the only issue before the supreme court was
whether the aggregate retained rights and powers were so substantial as
to render the settlor the owner of the trust assets so that the trust violated the statute of wills, since it had not been executed with the formalities required for a will.' In answering this question in the negative
the court has written valuable and significant black letter law for
Colorado practitioners, placing itself firmly behind the liberal, or
"Massachusetts rule" announced in National Shawmut Bank v. Joy.'
As a result, it is now clear that reservations of income, powers to alter,
amend or revoke, and certain types of control over investments will not
invalidate living trusts in Colorado as abortive testamentary dispositions.
The case clearly charters the many dispositive schemes now extant in
the state which rely on a revocable living trust with retained income
rights as the backbone of the plan, and to that extent, confirms practices in Colorado which have wide approval elsewhere.' While the case
goes no further than its own facts on the question of retained powers
over investments, most settlors should be satisfied with a power limited
to investments involving assets valued at one thousand dollars or more,
like the VonBrecht power, so that even here, the draftsman can easily
stay within the letter of the decision.
Three cases' involved procedure on the hearing of claims against
estates and each squarely followed the holding in Koon v. Barmettler7
I

Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 332 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1958).
8322 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1958). Four grounds had been set forth in the plaintilff's claim for relief. The plaintiff had obtained summary judgment below on her first ground:-that the trust instrument was a will and void
because it was unwitnessed. This summary judgment was the subject of the instant appeal to the supreme
court. The court reversed the summary judgment order and remanded the case to the trial court with direction
to hear and determine the other issues pr4sknted by the pleadings. (1) that the instument was void because
e ecuted as a result of undue influence upon the settlor; (2) That the settlor lacked the mental capacity to
enter into a trust agreement; and (3) That the settlor had made a binding agreement to revoke the trust and
had failed to do so. Petition for rehearing on the summary judgment Issue In the supreme court was denied
'on March. 31, 1958.
835 DICTA 146 (1958).
'Colo. Rev. Stat. J 152-5-3 (1953).
e6315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944).
a Cf. Cosner, Estate Planning 62 ff' (2d ed. 1956); Shattuck and Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook § 13
ff. (2d ed. 1953).
'Weller v. Bank of Vernal, 321 P.2d 216 (Colo. 1958); Film Enterprises v. Wolfberg, 321 P.2d 218 (Colo.
1958); Meyers v. Williams, 324 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1958).
' 134 Colo. 221. 201 P.2d 713 (1956).
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which established that the filing of a claim against an estate in a county
court confers on that court exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim so that no action involving the same claim can be filed in
any other court. In Weller v. Bank of Vernal,9 this resulted in dismissal
of a district court action against the administratrix of an estate where

a claim had been filed on a note in the county court having jurisdiction,
followed by commencement of a district court foreclosure action on the
same subject matter.
Film Enterprises v. Wolfberg'0 involved a situation in which an

action against the decedent was pending in district court at his death.
The plaintiff filed a claim against the estate based on the same subject
matter involved in the district court case. On the hearing of this claim,
the executrix having moved its disallowance, the county court held that

it lacked jurisdiction to determine the claim on its merits, because exclusive jurisdiction lay in the district court. However, the county court
further held that the claim could remain on file as notice until a final
determination of the district court proceeding pending in the supreme
court. On appeal, the supreme court held that the county court order
was not a final judgment from which a writ of error would lie. Thus,
the county court was held to have retained jurisdiction over the claim
and not to have rendered a final determination as to its validity, even
though that court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim on its merits.
Meyers v. Williams" involved a wrongful death action against a
decedent. A timely claim on the wrongful death issue was filed in county
court, but nine months after issuance of letters a district court action
involving the same subject matter was filed, naming decedent's executor
as a party defendant. The county court claim remained on file and undetermined at the time of the supreme court hearing, which was on a
writ of error by the defendant-executor after an adverse judgment in
the district court suit. Record objection to jurisdiction in the district
court was raised by the executor for the first time in the supreme court.

The court followed its Koon v. Barmettler holding and stated again that
the county court was the sole and exclusive forum for determination of
the issues involved, and reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the district court action.
Counsel for caveators to wills should have advance and secure fee
arrangements in view of Proudfit v. Koons." Here a caveat was success-

ful as to one of two wills, but unsuccessful as to the other. An application
was made to the county court for allowance of attorney's fees from the
estate to caveators' counsel on the theory of benefit rendered to the
estate and the parties in interest as a result of the successful caveat to
one of the wills. The application relied on earlier holdings awarding
allowances when ambiguous wills had required construction proceedings. The supreme court denied any allowance, holding that none was
authorized by statute, and that none should be allowed where services
were for the sole benefit of certain interested parties in a purely personal and adversary action.
9 321 P.2d 216 (Colo. 1958).
1o Id. at 218.
"1324 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1958).
12325 P.2d 273 (Colo. 1958).
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Kepler v. Burns" involved the interesting question succinctly
phrased by the trial court as follows:
"Is an executor of an estate entitled to interest on land sold
through probate court immediately upon order of court confirming the sale when the vendee is in possession but in the
absence of an overt tender of the deed by the executor and in
the absence of demand for interest when the deed and abstract
were finally tendered and payment made?' ""
The negative answer given to this question by the trial court was affirmed by the supreme court. It appeared that no tender of a deed
had been made for nearly fifteen months after the sale, and that the
interest was being sought as a result of a surcharge of the executor at the
request of certain beneficiaries of the estate. The supreme court's holding barred the executor from charging the interest back to the vendees
under the sales, since they had fully complied with the executor's demands, and their non-payment of the balance of the purchase price resulted only from the executor's non-tender of the deeds.
A constructive trust in land was decreed as a means of restoring a
breach by one of several joint venturers under a written joint venture
agreement in Lindsay v. Marcus." The joint venturers had agreed to purchase the land, and also agreed that one of their number should hold
title for the others, without disclosure. After the purchase was completed,
the nominee-venturer claimed to hold the property for his own account.
In decreeing the trust, the supreme court carefully reviewed the authorities and identified the nominee-venturer as a fiduciary for the others.
It affirmed the trial court's determination that there had been a sufficient breach of the existing fiduciary obligation to require the remedy
of the constructive trust.
The question of whether or not dispositive language used by a
,lawyer in his own will created a trust was before the court in Gately V.
El Paso County Bar Association." The deceased McAllister had left

his library to the defendant bar association, and plaintiff contended
that the language used was not that of absolute gift but such as to create
certain rights in him as one who came within the ambit of a trust. It was
held that no trust had been created and that the gift was absolute, so
that the bar association was acting within its rights in excluding nonmembers, including plaintiff, from use of the library. In reaching its
construction of the will, the court emphasized McAllister's standing at
the bar, and his omission of any use of the word "trust" in the will, as
indicative of the absence of intent to create a trust in the bequest to the
association. It also pointed out that there was no other specific language
from which any severance of the legal and equitable estates could be
established.
13 324 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1958).
" Id. at 787.
15 325 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1958).
'a 328 P.2d 381 (Colo. 1958).
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